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Chapter 13
The Ethics in the Management of Patients 
with Disorders of Consciousness
A. Demertzi
Abstract The ethical issues accrued from the study and management of patients 
with disorders of consciousness are variant and multifaceted. The medical, public 
and legal controversies are partly shaped by how different people think about pain 
perception and end of life. Uniform ethical frameworks need to be shaped in order 
to guide clinicians and caregivers in terms of clinical outcome, prognosis and medi-
cal management.
 Introduction
The introduction of the mechanical ventilator in the 1950s and the development of 
intensive care in the 1960s permitted many patients, who would otherwise might 
have died from apnea, to sustain their vegetative functions and survive their injuries. 
Paradoxically, in many cases these survivors were nevertheless found to suffer from 
altered states of consciousness which had never been encountered before [1]. The 
imminent ethical impact of these profound states of unconsciousness was reflected 
in the composition of the first bioethical committees discussing the redefinition of 
life and the concept of therapeutic obstinacy. In 1968 the Ad Hoc Committee of 
Harvard Medical School published a milestone paper for the redefinition of death as 
irreversible coma and brain failure [2]. The fact the committee comprised of ten 
physicians, a theologian, a lawyer and a historian of science, betokened the medical, 
legal and societal debates that were to follow.
A. Demertzi, Ph.D. 
Institut du Cerveau et de la Moelle Epinière (ICM) - Brain and Spine Insititute,  
Hôpital Pitié-Salpêtrière, 47, bd de l’Hôpital, 75013 Paris, France
Coma Science Group, GIGA Research Center and Neurology Department, University and 
University Hospital of Liège, Liège, Belgium
e-mail: a.demertzi@ulg.ac.be
226
 Consciousness Can Be Defined Clinically
Confusions and controversies are often a matter of definition. One multifaceted 
term with divergent connotations is consciousness [3]. For example, in a survey 
among healthcare professionals and students, it was found that although the major-
ity of participants denied the distinction between consciousness and the brain, more 
than one-third still regarded mind and brain as separate entities [4]. The way we 
define consciousness is crucial especially in the clinical setting because it may gov-
ern our opinions and eventually our actions. From a clinical viewpoint, conscious-
ness is defined as having two components, wakefulness and awareness [5]. Under 
this definition, many variant altered states of consciousness may be hosted. The 
most familiar to us all is the transition from conscious wakefulness to deep sleep: 
the drowsier we become, the less aware we get of our surroundings and of our-
selves. This implies that patients in coma and under anaesthesia are unaware because 
they cannot be awakened, even after painful stimulation. An exception to the way 
that these two components are related comes from patients in the so-called vegeta-
tive state (VS) or, as most recently defined, in unresponsive wakefulness syndrome 
(UWS) [6, 7]. Patients in VS/UWS typically open their eyes but never exhibit non- 
reflex voluntary movements indicating preserved awareness. In 2002, the term min-
imally conscious state (MCS) was introduced to describe those patients who showed 
more complex behaviours declarative of awareness, such as visual pursuit, orienta-
tion to pain or nonsystematic command following. Importantly, patients in MCS 
remain unable to communicate their thoughts and feelings [8]. Because these signs 
of consciousness often are small and fluctuating in time, this condition may be chal-
lenging to diagnose and to differentiate from the VS/UWS [9]. This is one of the 
reasons that assisting technologies, by providing data-driven objective evaluations 
of consciousness level, are becoming all the more an important source of informa-
tion that clinicians are often refer to in order to increase their clinical verdict, e.g. 
[10–13]. It has been suggested that once conscious awareness has been identified 
and its quality is estimated in a noncommunicating patient, this may well be a good 
reason to preserve life-sustaining aids [14]. However, the moral significance of pre-
served consciousness has been questioned on the grounds that it may not always be 
in patients’ best interest to continue a severely handicapped life [15]. Below we will 
see what kind of ethical concerns may arise during the medical management of 
DOC patients and how healthcare workers and next of kin consider these issues.
 Emerging Ethical Issues About Pain
The day-to-day needs of patients with DOC are exclusively covered by the health-
care providers and patients’ families and next of kin. Patients with DOC cannot 
communicate their feelings or experience, but it is not unusual that during cares, 
they will exhibit facial expressions and/or vocalize. Such behaviours can be 
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confusing for the carers as they might consider them as reactions to pain. As defined 
by the Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, “pain and suffering refer to the unpleasant 
experiences that occur in response to stimulation of peripheral nociceptive receptors 
and their peripheral and central afferent pathways or that they may emanate endog-
enously from the depths of human self-perception” [16]. Thus, pain constitutes a 
conscious experience with a physical (nociception) and a psychological counterpart 
(suffering). This also suggests that nociception by itself is not sufficient to cause 
suffering. Such differentiation is reflected on how clinicians perceive pain in these 
patients. According to surveyed attitudes among healthcare professionals, there was 
a unanimous support that patients in MCS (96%) perceive pain, whereas opinions 
were less clear for the VS/UWS (56%) [17]. Considering these results on varying 
beliefs about pain perception in DOC, physicians and healthcare workers’ views on 
analgesia and symptom management may also be affected. Since nearly half of the 
surveyed doctors expressed that VS/UWS patients do not feel pain, they could be 
expected to act accordingly, for instance, by not providing analgesic medication in 
these patients during cares. How, then, are clinicians supposed to infer whether a 
patient in VS/UWS or MCS feels pain and that she/he may be suffering? At the 
patient’s bedside, we are limited to evaluate the behavioural responsiveness to pain: 
if patients do not show signs of voluntary movement, such as to localize the source 
of noxious stimulus, it can be concluded they do not experience pain. Recently, the 
Nociception Coma Scale-Revised [18] was introduced as a more specific measure 
of pain in patients with DOC. However, the absence of a behavioural response can-
not be taken as a proof of the absence of conscious perception [19]. As such, the 
inference of pain and suffering merely by observing behavioural responses may be 
misleading. This can be dramatically illustrated in the case of conscious but para-
lysed locked-in syndrome (LIS) patients, who, when in a total LIS, they are unable 
to use motor function to respond to painful stimulation [20]. Importantly, patients 
with DOC will show restricted motor reactions to noxious stimulation, either stereo-
typed extension denoting “decerebration” or stereotyped flexion denoting “decorti-
cation”. In addition, they will frequently show increased arousal levels (evidenced 
by opening or widening of the eyes), quickening of breathing, increased heart rate 
and blood pressure or grimace-like or crying-like behaviours. As all these abilities 
are also seen in infants with anencephaly [21], they are considered to be of subcorti-
cal origin and not necessarily reflecting conscious perception of pain. Functional 
neuroimaging studies may assist in the formulation of a clearer clinical picture as 
regards pain perception in DOC. By means of positron emission tomography (PET), 
it has been shown that patients in VS/UWS exhibited cerebral processing of the 
incoming noxious stimulus (activation of primary somatosensory areas), but the 
observed neural activity was isolated and disconnected from higher-order associa-
tive brain areas which are considered necessary for conscious perception [22]. 
Critically, the results were very different for patients in MCS, as these patients 
showed cerebral activation in a more widespread network of regions similar to that 
of healthy controls, suggesting a potential pain perception these patients [23].
Taken together, these studies suggest that pain perception in DOC is an issue 
which may govern their actions. For instance, clinicians may decide not to provide 
13 The Ethics in the Management of Patients with Disorders of Consciousness
228
analgesic medication in VS/UWS patients during care or during the dying process 
after withdrawal of artificial hydration and nutrition [24], the latter on the grounds 
that these patients are deployed from experiencing suffering from hunger or thirst 
[25]. But would clinicians’ views on pain perception influence their attitudes on end 
of life? It might be, for example, that caregivers would opt for an irreversible deci-
sion after the principle of non-maleficence (i.e. “do not harm”), to spare their patient 
from unnecessary suffering. According to a European survey, this does not seem to 
be the case. Among healthcare professions, treatment withdrawal for chronic VS/
UWS was supported more (77%) when respondents considered that these patients 
do not feel pain [26]. Hence, it seems that clinicians made their decision according 
to formal guidelines on pain management in the end of life. In particular, the Multi- 
Society Task Force on PVS negates the possibility that patients in VS/UWS experi-
ence pain. In the same line is the Royal College of Physicians, which nevertheless 
recommends the administration of sedatives after treatment withdrawal, targeting at 
the elimination of a remote possibility of suffering [27]. According to the same 
survey, albeit less pronounced as compared to VS/UWS, the opinions for chronic 
MCS were similar: only 29% of respondents supported treatment withdrawal when 
they thought that these patients feel pain, and 38% considered treatment limitation 
options when they thought that MCS patient did not feel pain [26]. Therefore, it may 
be that clinicians feel more comfortable with treatment limitation options once they 
assure that the potential risk for pain perception is as low as possible. At the same 
time, it might be that respondents equalized pain perception with preserved aware-
ness. In that respect, the potential existence of pain would give a strong reason to 
preserve life than opt for treatment limitation options.
 Emerging Ethical Issues About End of Life
In the intensive care, medical doctors and assisting staff are confronted daily with 
situations where clinical decisions are critical, such as continuing or withdrawing 
life-sustaining treatment. Treatment limitations can be viewed as having two direc-
tions depending on whether the decision is made preoperatively or after an interven-
tion [28]. In the former case, it may come as a refusal of cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation (CPR) in case of cardiopulmonary arrest. In the latter case, it most 
usually comes as a decision to withdraw treatment, such as the artificial respirator 
or artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH). CPR is almost automatically performed 
as an emergency therapy in order to restore heartbeat and ceased breathing, unless 
the patient or the legal representative has refused it in advance in a form of Do Not 
Resuscitate (DNR) order. Nevertheless, it should be noted that DNRs do not neces-
sarily prohibit other therapies. They rather authorize the physician to act on this 
specific manner of therapy [29]. When the clinical condition of a patient has been 
stabilized and denoted as irreversible, decisions about ANH limitation may come 
into play. From a bioethical standpoint, withdrawing ANH is comparable to with-
drawing mechanical ventilation, even if emotionally they may be perceived 
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differently. In the intensive care, the majority of deaths are the result of a medical 
decision to withhold or withdraw treatment [30]. Such decisions are  evidence-based 
and rely on validated clinical or paraclinical markers of bad outcome (e.g. for anoxic 
coma see [31]). Despite the controversy as to whether ANH constitutes a medical 
treatment [32] and thus should never be withdrawn from patients [33], most of the 
Anglo-Saxon medical community would agree with its being a medical therapy 
which can be refused by patients and surrogate decision-makers [34]. Such deci-
sions in the VS/UWS are only justified when a case is denoted as irreversible [27]. 
To date, guidelines with regard to temporal determination of a definitive outcome in 
the VS/UWS state that if no recovery is observed within 3  months after a non- 
traumatic or 12 months after a traumatic accident, the condition of the patient can 
be denoted as permanent [16].
The controversies around the clinical management at the end of life in DOC 
patients were reflected in a European survey (n = 2475), where the majority (66%) 
of healthcare professionals agreed to withdraw treatment from chronic VS/UWS 
patients, whereas only 28% agreed so for the chronic MCS [35]. Additionally, 82% 
of the clinicians wished not to be kept alive if they imagined themselves in a chronic 
VS/UWS, and a similarly high proportion (67%) agreed so if they imagined them-
selves in a chronic MCS [35]. Geographical region and religion were among the 
factors that explained most of the variance in the responses. The detected differ-
ences between the two states could be due to the existing legal ambiguity around 
MCS which may have influenced the surveyed participants to differentiate between 
expressing preferences for self versus others, by implicitly recognizing that the lat-
ter could be a step on the slippery slope to euthanasia.
Clinicians’ opinions appear much more uniform with regard to brain death [36]. 
As mentioned earlier, the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School went 
on to the redefinition of death as a consequence of the technological advancements 
in the intensive care, where patients could sustain their severe injuries but maintain 
the function of vital organs [2]. It was, hence, possible to dissociate between car-
diac, respiratory and brain functions which in turn required an alternative definition 
of death, moving from a cardiorespiratory towards a neurocentric formulation (i.e. 
irreversible coma). According to the latter, death can be viewed either as death of 
the whole brain or of the brainstem or as neocortical [37]. The first two are defined 
as the irreversible cessation of the organism as a whole, differing in their anatomical 
interpretation [38], whereas the last solely requires the irreversible loss of the capac-
ity of consciousness and social interaction but has never convinced medical or legal 
scholars. The main utility of the introduction of brain death is that it permitted vital 
organ procurement for transplantation with the application of ethical restrictions, 
such as the dead donor rule (i.e. a patient has to be declared dead before the removal 
of life-sustaining organs). Based on the neocortical definition of death, however, 
both patients in VS/UWS and MCS can be declared dead. It has been argued that the 
neocortical definition is conceptually inadequate and practically unfeasible, espe-
cially in lack of a complete understanding of higher-order conscious functioning. 
Hence, patients with DOC are not dead [30], and organ donation options in these 
patients should be excluded since they violate the dead donor rule [39].
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 Legal Issues in Disorders of Consciousness
Disorders of consciousness have posed not only medical challenges, but in many 
cases they required the mediation of legal authorities in order to regulate ambiguous 
and controversial issues, such as end-of-life decisions. When end-of-life wishes 
have not been earlier formulated in the form of an advanced directive (i.e. written 
statement completed by a competent person in anticipation of her/his future incom-
petence, expressing personal treatment preferences and formal surrogacy appoint-
ment), then a surrogate decision-maker is eligible to take responsibility of the 
patient’s clinical management. The way the legal representative should act on behalf 
of the patient is a progressive one: (a) the surrogate should first attempt to follow the 
wishes of the patient as closely as possible the way they were expressed before the 
accident, either orally or in the form of advance directives; (b) when the wishes are 
unknown and an advance directive is not available, the surrogate decision-maker 
should try to reproduce the patients’ preferences based on their history and personal 
values; (c) when this is not possible, the decisions should rely on more objective 
markers that determine the patients’ best interest (e.g. likelihood of recovery, pain 
management, impact on family) [28, 40]. The proxy decision-maker should mediate 
trying to maximize patients’ self-determination and protect their interests on the 
principles of beneficence and non-maleficence.
The use of advance directives could also be considered as a means to regulate 
cost savings in the end of life. Once the wishes of a terminal patient are known, care 
can be taken as to constrain extraordinary means and spare the available resources 
on other urgent cases. However, no such rationale corresponds to the reality, and 
advance directives, together with hospice care and the elimination of futile care, 
have not contributed to the effective regulation of the economics of dying [41]. 
Treatment resources are not unlimited, and despite care for a good death, sometimes 
physicians need to do with the means they have available. The allocation of resources 
and the economics at the end of life have not yet been fully determined for DOC 
patients. In intensive care medicine, some unwritten rules can facilitate decisions as 
to who is to be treated, like the “first come” principle or “who will most likely ben-
efit from the intensive care” [42]. However, for chronic DOC cases, information on 
resource allocation often is lacking. This may be due to the nature of chronic VS/
UWS and MCS patients. These are severely brain-damaged patients for whom the 
dilemma on treating becomes crucial either because treatments are not guaranteed 
as successful (i.e. the condition is too bad to be treated) or unkind (i.e. the quality of 
life of those surviving is not acceptable) which may lead to an unwise way to allo-
cate the available resources.
The legal provisions concerning the end-of-life issues in DOC differ from coun-
try to country. In the United States, where a patient-centred medical framework has 
been adopted, the patient is allowed to participate in the regulation of her/his own 
course of the disease. In the case of DOC, legal representatives in close collabora-
tion with the clinical staff and in line with the patients’ previously expressed wishes 
may decide together about the long-term care of irreversibly comatose patients. 
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There are times, however, when conflict of interests arises while making such deci-
sions either between family and physicians, such as in the Quinlan case [43] or 
among family members, like the Schiavo case [44]. As most often such cases require 
the mediation of the court, they may have a wider publicity where the public opinion 
can come into play and may lead to societal movements on pro-life versus right-to- 
die action groups [45]. In Europe there are more subtle differences in the way treat-
ment limitation is perceived, especially between Northern (more right-to-die 
oriented) and Southern European countries (more pro-life positioned) [35]. In gen-
eral, decisions for treatment limitation, usually concerning ANH, need to be taken 
after reference to the court. Exceptions are the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland 
and Scandinavian countries where no court mediation is needed for limiting treat-
ment in DOC patients [46].
 Conclusions
Early since disorders of consciousness appeared in the clinical setting, clinicians, 
scholars, theologians and ethicists began to wonder what it is like to be in a state of 
profoundly disturbed consciousness. Are these unresponsive patients in pain, and 
can they even suffer from it? How can their quality of life be assessed? More impor-
tantly, is a life in such severely restricted conditions worth living? Controversies of 
these kinds mainly stem from how different people regard indefinite survival in 
disorders of consciousness. Despite the general view that quality of life is dimin-
ished in disease as a result of limited capacities to functionally engage in everyday 
living, these attitudes are formulated from a third-person perspective. Consequently, 
only rough estimations about what it is like to be in such a situation can be made. 
For instance, an analysis of public media reports on Terri Schiavo revealed that in 
some cases, the patient was described as feeling discomfort, which was incompati-
ble with her clinical state [47]. This implies that nonmedical individuals, whose 
opinions are supposedly represented by media reports, may be biased towards resid-
ual cognitive function of patients with consciousness alterations. Such bias could be 
attributed to the fact that patients’ quality of life evaluations are made from the 
perspective of healthy individuals who tend to underestimate patients’ subjective 
well-being [48]. Indeed, we recently showed that patients in LIS expressed a posi-
tive subjective quality of life contrary to what could be expected in this condition 
[49]. As mentioned above, patients with LIS do not suffer from disorders of con-
sciousness. As such, LIS patients constitute a nice control population for patients 
with disorders of consciousness due to their resemblance in terms of physical dis-
ability and possibly common history, such like LIS patients can have been in 
comatose- like states. Interestingly, when healthcare professionals were asked 
whether they wished to be kept alive if imagined themselves in this condition, 56% 
did not wish so despite the majority (75%) opposing to treatment withdrawal in LIS 
[50]. When LIS was compared to DOC, more respondents endorsed that being in a 
LIS was worse than being in a VS/UWS state or MCS (59%). Such studies suggest 
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that personal characteristics mediate opinions about DOC and LIS. The dissociation 
between personal preferences and general opinions underlies the difference in per-
spective in disability and implies that healthy persons who are not in direct contact 
with this patient population can have distorted pictures as to what is life in these 
severely constrained situations. By means of functional neuroimaging and electro-
physiology, however, the grey zones of unconsciousness start getting illuminated 
[51]. In should be noted that although these developments are promising to detect 
and evaluate preserved awareness in these conditions, they need to be translated in 
clinical practice. For example, in terms of treatment planning, such as pain manage-
ment and end-of-life decision-making, patients with disorders of consciousness are 
now offered the possibility to express their preferences by means of brain-computer 
interfaces. What remains to be clarified is the degree to which such indirect responses 
can be considered reliable and worthy of legal representation. Uniform ethical 
frameworks need to be shaped in order to guide clinicians and caregivers in terms of 
clinical outcome, prognosis and medical management.
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